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Chinese Philosophy and Universal Values in 
Contemporary China1
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Abstract
Consistent with its growing economic, political and military might, China wants due 
recognition by and engagement with the global community of nations. This aspiration is 
complicated by the fact that Chinese political leaders and intellectuals continue to strug-
gle with how “Chinese values” fit with “universal values”, and whether there is a single 
global modernity or whether there are multiple modernities and multiple—perhaps com-
peting—universal values. In this paper I examine how some prominent Chinese philoso-
phers are engaging with these issues, despite the fact that in 2013 the topic of “universal 
values” was prohibited as a discussion topic in universities on the mainland. 
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Izvleček
Kitajska si v skladu s svojo naraščajočo gospodarsko, politično in vojaško močjo želi 
ustreznega priznanja in sodelovanja z globalno skupnostjo narodov. Zaplete pri tem pri-
zadevanju povzroča dejstvo, da se kitajski politični voditelji in intelektualci še vedno spo-
padajo z vprašanjem, kako se »kitajske vrednote« ujemajo z »univerzalnimi vrednotami« 
in ali obstaja enotna svetovna modernost, ali pa je nemara več modernosti in več – morda 
v medsebojnem tekmovanju – univerzalnih vrednot. V tem članku proučujem, kako se 
nekateri vidni kitajski filozofi soočajo s temi vprašanji, čeprav je bila leta 2013 na univer-
zah na celini tema »univerzalnih vrednot« kot razpravna tema prepovedana.
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1 A shorter French version of this essay will be published in “Philosophie chinoise et valeurs univer-
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Editions Gallimard), in press.
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Consistent with its growing economic, political and military might, China wants 
due recognition by and engagement with the global community of nations. This 
aspiration is complicated by the fact that Chinese political leaders and intellectuals 
continue to struggle with how “Chinese values” fit with “universal values”, and 
whether there is a single global modernity or whether there are multiple moderni-
ties and multiple—perhaps competing—universal values. This essay examines how 
some prominent Chinese philosophers and intellectuals are engaging with these 
issues, despite the fact that in 2013 the topic of “universal values” was prohibited 
as a discussion topic in universities on the mainland. Key Chinese intellectuals in-
troduced include Chen Lai, Zhao Tingyang, Xu Jilin, Ge Zhaoguang, Guo Qiyong 
and a range of younger academics associated with the Kang Clique (Kang dang), as 
well as Confucian revivalists who self-consciously identify as so-called “Mainland 
New Confucians”. Attention is also paid to both advocates and critics of attempts 
to revive the idea of tianxia, “All under Heaven”. The essay concludes with a short 
reflection on whether a new sort of tianxia world order might already be with us.
Background 
The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed the growth of an influential movement in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong to “Sinicize” (Zhongguohua 中國化) or “indigenize” 
(bentuhua 本土化) the social sciences, in particular social psychology, anthro-
pology and sociology (Chang 2005). The movement promoted a return to the 
cultural roots of “being Chinese” and the development of “Sinicized” social 
and behavioural science approaches to research. In Taiwan, the indigenization 
process began under the name of “Zhongguohua” (Sinicization) because, in the 
social sciences, China was regarded as the “local” during the 1980s. The term 
bentuhua was also adopted to refer to this same idea. By and large, the term 
Zhongguohua represented the claim that the social sciences (or particular social 
science disciplines) should be grounded in local/regional culture, experience, and 
perspectives, where “local/regional” variously refers to a somewhat vague no-
tion of “China” or Chinese society (including Taiwan), or to particular “Huaren 
華人” (Sinitic) societies, or to Taiwan. The basic theme of the movement was 
that Chinese social scientists should be self-conscious, self-critical, and inde-
pendent (that is, not subordinated to the West) so as to contribute to making 
the world’s social science disciplines more cosmopolitan and globalized through 
proper  acknowledgement being afforded to national and cultural particularities. 
By the mid-1980s, however, the term “indigenization” as used in Taiwan came 
to refer to the process of “Taiwanization” in the cultural and political arenas. 
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With the end of martial rule and removal of press restrictions in 1987, and the 
emergence of Taiwanese cultural nationalism that same decade, renewed interest 
in Taiwanese history and culture began to consolidate and assert itself in both 
intellectual and popular discourses. The Kuomindang’s 1991 abandonment of its 
claim to be the legitimate government of all China and the implementation of 
a democratic electoral system at the national level legitimized political and in-
tellectual interest in a Taiwanese identity. Sinicization gradually lost favour in 
Taiwan during the 1990s as a consequence of the changing political landscape,2 
but during the same period the terms “Sinicization” and “indigenization” both 
found support among anthropologists and psychologists on the mainland (ibid., 
245; Qiao 2001; Xu 2001).
It was also in the 1990s that a similar trend gradually became embedded in the 
field of Chinese philosophy, particularly on the mainland. However, unlike the 
Sinicization movement in 1970s and 1980s Taiwan, here the goal of recognizing 
the local was not subordinated to that of introducing a Chinese voice into the 
discipline of philosophy in order to make the discipline more global and more 
cosmopolitan and thereby reinforce the discipline’s universalist claims. Rather, 
the case of Chinese philosophy emerged as a response to the perceived threat 
that the universalist claims of theory posed to the particularity of local cultural 
identity.
A watershed in this process of development occurred in the early years of the 
new millennium with the so-called legitimacy of Chinese philosophy debate 
(Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing 中國哲學的合法性) (Defoort 2001; Defoort and 
Ge 2006). Many Chinese academics argued that “Western philosophy” had yet to 
acknowledge “the legitimacy” of Chinese philosophy and to engage it as an equal 
partner in dialogue. Others further insisted that the articulation and development 
of China’s philosophical heritage must draw exclusively on the paradigms and 
norms of China’s indigenous traditions, and that paradigms and norms derived 
from the West, in particular, are not only inappropriate but hegemonic and/or 
2 The Democratic Progress Party, formed in 1986, won the presidential elections for the first time 
in 2000. The ascendancy of the Democratic Progressive Party was accompanied by a deepening 
movement to “indigenize” political, social, and cultural institutions on the island, in which indi-
genization (bentuhua) came to function as a type of nationalism that championed the legitimacy 
of a distinct Taiwanese identity, the character and content of which should be determined by the 
Taiwanese people. Many proponents of indigenization in Taiwan regard it quite specifically as 
a project of desinicization: an attempt to remove the yoke of “Chinese” colonial hegemony so 
that Taiwan’s putative native (bentu) identity could be recognized and further nurtured. For these 
proponents, the role of the Other in the indigenization paradigm is identified with a monolithic 
conception of China and Chineseness, which is typically portrayed as inimical to the integrity of 
Taiwanese identity.
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ill-suited to China’s national “conditions”. For example, writing in 2009, the 
Hong Kong philosopher Shun Kwong-loi 信廣來 insisted that: “It is by studying 
Chinese ethical thought on its own terms that we can bring out its more distinc-
tive ideas, which can then be fleshed out and developed without being shaped 
by agendas set by Western philosophical discussions” (Shun 2009, 476). Shun 
drew attention to the consequences of the modern default practice of using West-
ern concepts and frameworks for doing comparative work between Chinese and 
Western philosophies, noting that, “while we see frequent deployment of Western 
philosophical frameworks in the study of Chinese thought, we rarely encoun-
ter the reverse phenomenon, namely, the deployment of Chinese philosophical 
frameworks in the study of Western thought”. He continues:
… We see engaged discussions of such questions as whether Mozi is a 
utilitarian, but not whether John Stuart Mill is a Moist or endorses jianai 
兼愛. We find debates about whether traditional Chinese thought has a 
conception of rights but not whether Western traditions have a concep-
tion of li 理. And, more recently, we see debates about whether Confu-
cian ethics is a form of virtue ethics but not about whether Aristotelian 
ethics is a form of lixue 理學. (ibid., 456–57, 472)
Support for these kinds of concerns was, in turn, bolstered by a robust Confu-
cian-centred Chinese cultural nationalism: a movement based on the ideological 
conviction that Confucianism is a cultural formation integral to the identity con-
sciousness of the Chinese (Zhonghua 中華) nation.
Universal Values and their Discontents
Similar views were also raised in the context of guoxue re 國學熱 or National 
Learning fad that also peaked at the end of the first decade of the new millennium 
(Makeham 2011). Although definitions of guoxue vary, often considerably, most 
Chinese scholars seem to favour a broad definition, usually along the lines of 
“a general collective term for traditional Chinese culture”, “traditional Chinese 
scholarship” or “research on Chinese culture”. A major figure in instigating both 
the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy debate and reviving guoxue is Chen Lai 
陳來. He is currently Professor of Philosophy at Tsinghua University and the 
Dean of Tsinghua University’s Guoxue yuan 國學院, which goes by the English 
name of the Academy of Chinese Learning. In a notable article published in the 
Guangming ribao in 2010 he wrote:
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Historians long ago pointed out that China’s several thousand years of 
unbroken historical record is unique in the world. The principles inform-
ing all social sciences must be subjected to and validated by the test of 
China’s historical experience before their veracity can be proven. The 
National Learning fever helps people to reflect critically upon the stand-
point from which Western culture takes the particular to be the universal; 
to reflect critically upon the importation or transplantation of Western 
systems of learning; and, by taking due account of China’s experience 
and China’s wisdom, establish a subjectivity for Chinese culture, and 
promote the equal exchange of the world’s many cultures. (Chen 2010)
Other protagonists at the time also expressed concerns about the effects of West-
ern systems of learning in China. For example, some worried that because classi-
cal studies—an inalienable part of National Learning—has been reduced to phi-
losophy, philology, history, or anthropology, this had led to methodological con-
fusion and impeded true understanding (Chen 2009, 178). Others despaired that: 
The Western system of academic disciplines has led to the breaking up 
and fragmentation of China’s traditional learning. Because of this, guo-
xue cannot exist and develop as an organic whole. Consequently, it is dif-
ficult to guarantee that China’s traditional learning and culture can exert 
a strong influence among the national cultures of the world. (Jiao 2010) 
Still others similarly complained that traditional bodies of learning associated 
with the bibliographic taxonomy of the Four Divisions, the Sibu 四部—classics, 
histories, masters and collected writings—had not only each been subjected to 
dislocation, but that the knowledge contained in each had become mere “materi-
al” for disciplines introduced from the West (Zhu 2009).
Since then, complaints about Western cultural imperialism have not been the con-
cern of academics alone; concerns about the cultural particularly of so-called univer-
sal values have also become a major issue for China’s leaders. Consistent with its 
growing economic, political and military might, China wants due recognition by and 
engagement with the global community of nations. This aspiration is complicated by 
the fact that Chinese political leaders and intellectuals continue to struggle with how 
“Chinese values” fit with “universal values” and global institutions, and whether 
there is a single global modernity—one perhaps China can shape—or whether there 
are multiple modernities and multiple—perhaps competing—universal values.3
3 To belabour the obvious, the presumption that “multiple modernities” implies “multiple universal 
values”, is problematic, not least because of the implication that universality can be multiple. 
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In the wake of the PRC leadership transition to President Xi Jinping in mid-No-
vember, 2012, the party-state’s hostility to universal values increased notably. 
This shift was most evident when Liu Qibao 劉奇葆 became the head of the Pub-
licity Department, which oversees propaganda. Early in 2013, a notice was sent to 
universities about “seven prohibited topics of discussions” (qi bu jiang 七不講). 
Universal values topped the list of prohibited topics, and there remains significant 
reticence about discussing this topic openly.
President Xi Jinping’s most important speech on universal values was given at the 
Central Party School at the end of 2015, in which he berated foreign powers for 
using Western “universal values” to subvert China’s socialist ideology:
Within and beyond the nation, various antagonistic powers are always 
trying to undermine what our Party stands for. Most damagingly, they 
plot to get us to cast aside our faith in Marxism and discard our belief 
in Socialism and Communism. And even some of our comrades within 
the Party, who haven’t clearly perceived the hidden agenda therein, think 
that since Western “universal values” have endured for several centu-
ries, why shouldn’t we identify with them? What’s wrong with borrow-
ing some Western political discourse? It won’t bring any great harm ... 
These people thus unwittingly become a cheer squad for Capitalist ide-
ology. (Xi 2016)
In going on to address the topic of strengthening the Party’s work on theoretical 
education, Xi Jinping stressed the need for Party educators to provide clear guid-
ance to students in the Central Party School about the proper way to understand 
issues such as: 
• the scientific nature of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”; 
• strengthening and improving Party leadership; 
• the scientific content of the values of freedom, democracy and equality; and 
• what in the West are called universal values.
Now, it might seem incongruous that values such as freedom, democracy and 
equality are distinguished from what Xi Jinping refers to as “what in the West are 
called universal values”. Here we need to bear in mind that, already early in 2012, 
the Party’s ideological authorities had proclaimed a set of “core socialist values” 
(社會主義核心價值), as follows:
National values
• Prosperity (富强)
• Democracy (民主)
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• Civility (文明)
• Harmony (和諧)
Social values
• Freedom (自由)
• Equality (平等)
• Justice (公正)
• Rule of law (法治)
Individual values
• Patriotism (愛國)
• Dedication (敬業)
• Integrity (誠信)
• Friendship (友善)
Collectively, the twelve values are obviously an amalgam of past and present, 
local and global conceptual ingredients. Oddly, however, there is no hint of just 
what foundation this motley set of values is rooted in. What is clear from Xi Jin-
ping’s comments, however, is that freedom, democracy and equality are not to be 
identified with their Western namesakes.
Chen Lai
Despite the explicit criticisms of universal values and the championing of core 
socialist values, some prominent Chinese academics have not only managed to 
navigate these dangerous political waters, but have also accrued significant po-
litical capital in the process. Chen Lai is perhaps the most prominent example. 
As noted above, Chen is Professor of Philosophy at Tsinghua University and the 
Dean of Tsinghua University’s Guoxue yuan. He is widely regarded as the fore-
most specialist of Confucian philosophy in China. In 2018, he was also appointed 
as a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中國人
民政治協商會議), a national legislative advisory body in the People’s Republic 
of China. This appointment is a strong endorsement by the Party of Chen Lai, and 
of his approach to the issue of universal and particular values.
In an insightful recent article, intellectual historian Hoyt Cleveland Tillman 
writes: 
In the current political environment, where Chinese particularistic val-
ues are lauded and universals are highly suspect, it is impressive that 
Chen Lai has set forth a synthesis of Confucianism and Marxism in terms 
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of their projected universalities. For example, his portrayal of freedom, 
equality and justice as universally desired goals or values, is grounded 
in his own account of Confucian moral values; therefore, he is able to 
propose his case for linking these three values to the political ends of 
Chinese Socialism and the common good of society, rather than through 
a Liberal Western discourse on rights. (Tillman 2018, 1276)
Besides approving of Chen Lai’s 2014 book, Renxue benti lun 仁學本體論 (Hu-
maneness-based Ontology), the authorities have reportedly praised Chen Lai’s 
approach to discussing universal values. According to Tillman: 
The Party-controlled media’s embrace of his recent books and articles re-
inforces the impression that despite its sensitivity to, and policies against, 
universal values, the Chinese Communist Party still includes members 
who are not totally opposed to the universal significance of values, but 
are anxious to re-define those values to accord not only with Chinese 
tradition (as Chen has done) but also to be compatible to the conditions 
deemed necessary for continued political control. (ibid., 1284)
Chen Lai is an expert on Neo-Confucian philosophy of the Song (960–1279) 
and Ming (1368–1644) periods. His self-styled “humaneness-based ontology” is 
a sophisticated attempt to develop a new ontology, drawing inspiration from a 
range of thinkers, including the great Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 
(1130–1200). One of Chen’s more creative appropriations of Zhu Xi’s thought 
concerns Zhu Xi’s account of the unity of the virtues, in which one cardinal vir-
tue, that of humaneness, is foundational for a group of other cardinal virtues. 
Specifically, these cardinal virtues are the four that the classical Confucian phi-
losopher Mencius (fourth century BC) first clustered as a group: humaneness (ren 
仁); doing what is just and one’s duty (yi 義); behaving with decorum (li 禮); and 
wisdom (zhi 智). What is distinctive in Zhu Xi’s account of the unity of these 
virtues is that humaneness is presented as sustaining and giving rise to the other 
three virtues.
Chen Lai’s creative appropriation was to adapt Zhu Xi’s strategy and make 
humanness the foundation not only of other Confucian virtues, but also of the 
universal values of freedom (ziyou 自由), equality (pingdeng 平等), and justice 
(gongzheng 公正) (Chen 2014, 429). 
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humaneness
freedom
equality
justice
Credit: John Makeham
Chen further seeks to persuade the reader that these four “universal values” are a 
legacy of the Chinese Confucian tradition, and thus not simply an import from the 
West. As Tillman notes, this resulting synthesis of values is presented as having 
advantages over Western programmes of universal values. On the one hand, Chen 
Lai wants to insist that China’s concept of humaneness can embrace the global, 
because the Chinese concept of humaneness is the essential foundation of all val-
ues. On the other hand, he seeks to reject claims that the Western universalistic 
value of democracy should apply to China (Tillman 2018, 1278).
In a 2015 Renmin ribao article, Chen Lai wrote:
In discussing the particular characteristics of the values of “Chinese” 
civilization (Zhonghua wenming 中華文明), we cannot attend only to 
the moral concepts of Chinese culture but must take Western culture as 
a comparator—in particular the values of modern Western culture—in 
order to discern the particular characteristics of the values of Chinese 
civilization. When compared to modern Western values, there are four 
particular characteristics of the values of Chinese civilization:
• responsibility comes before freedom; 
• duty comes before rights; 
• the social group comes before the individual person; and
• harmony is esteemed over conflict.
In Western culture and Western values there is a conflict mentality that 
always seeks to use its own power, and take a self-centred stance to 
overcome, control and dominate others. Because of this, religious wars 
throughout Western history are extremely brutal; in contrast, China has 
never experienced such religious wars. It can indeed be said that the 
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cultural origins of the twentieth century’s two world wars do no lie in the 
East. Overall, it can be said that when compared to Western culture and 
Western values, Chinese culture and Chinese values emphasize harmony 
over conflict. (Chen 2015a, 7)
Instead of demonstrating how such values of liberty, equality, and justice are ac-
tualized or evident in the policies and institutions of the PRC, Chen Lai uses the 
Singapore model of “Asian values” to implicitly support his case that the Chinese 
value system can encompass such modern values. He further insists that the core 
of Asian values is Confucian. In 2015 Chen Lai published the volume, Zhonghua 
wenming de hexin jiazhi 中華文明的核心價值 (The Core Values of Chinese Civ-
ilization). In an appendix to that volume, Chen writes:
Are there new universal values that have been brought forth out of Con-
fucianism itself, values that differ from liberal democratic ones? I think 
there are. In today’s world the most influential ones are undoubtedly 
what Singapore has called Asian values. Asian values include five main 
values: 
• first the social state is more important than the individual; 
• second, the roots of the state are in the family; 
• third, the state must respect the individual; 
• fourth, harmony is better than conflict at maintaining social order; 
and
• fifth, there must be peaceful coexistence and complementarity be-
tween religions. 
I think that if I were to look at this topic of “new universal values” I 
would naturally think of the example of Singapore. These five principles 
not only include traditional East Asian values; they also include the new 
values that have been absorbed from Western civilization over the past 
century, such as the one stipulating that the state must respect the indi-
vidual. Actually, Singapore’s set of Asian values is a systematic set of 
values that does not give priority to individualism. This is Singapore’s 
version of modern Asian values, and I think that this is also Singapore’s 
version of the values of modern Confucian civilization, the core of which 
is not the priority of the individual’s right of freedom, but the good of 
society and the community. (ibid. 2015b, 199–200)
I note in passing that Chen Lai made almost exactly the same comments about 
Asian values as early as 1998 (ibid. 1998, 12).
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Critiques of the Individual
Asian values, of course, refers to the cultural relativist claim that many of the po-
litical, social and cultural norms of the late twentieth century are Western, and are 
not universal norms. As such, these Western norms are not more legitimate than 
alternative norms that could be considered “Asian”. Asian values are particularly 
associated with the communitarian position which advocates that the rights of 
the community—be it the family or the state—take precedence over those of the 
individual.
In the Asian values debate in Singapore in the 1990s, the role of the family cre-
ated a dilemma for Lee Kuan Yew, as it did for many other advocates of “Asian 
values” at the time. Writing at the end of the 1990s, historian Michael Barr noted 
that this is because the family is expected to fulfil two contradictory roles:
It needs to be the building block of society and to provide the rationale 
for the paternalistic state, but it is also expected to be completely—and 
often humiliatingly—subservient to the needs of the state and the needs 
of the capitalist economy … Family-based communitarianism can be 
and is being used as a tool to support state-focused communitarianism, 
but this is not its natural function. In their purest forms the two are rivals. 
In its most extreme form, state-focused communitarianism is a form of 
totalitarianism that cannot allow any alternative sources of authority or 
power in society. (Barr 2000, 326, 328)
As it happens, a similar tension has been playing itself out in China over the 
past decade in a series of ongoing debates between two prominent Chinese phi-
losophers, Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇 and Liu Qingping 劉清平, and their respective 
supporters (Huang 2017). The debate focuses on the concept of filial piety. Liu 
Qingping has argued that Confucian philosophy rests on a fundamental paradox: 
on the one hand, it privileges consanguineous affection, love for family members, 
and yet and on the other hand, it promotes loving concern for all 4 (Liu 2003, 236–
37). As summarized by Hagop Sarkissian, “Liu argues that Confucianism ought 
to put a more universal ethic at its core and jettison its emphasis on kin relations, 
paving the way for a new Post-Confucianism, which would value universal care 
or concern well ahead of filial piety” (Sarkissian 2010, 731).
In response to Liu, Guo Qiyong defended the idea of the mutual non-disclosure 
of wrongdoings among family members, based on early texts such as the Ana-
lects and Mencius. He maintained that this moral principle is grounded in human 
4 Liu first developed these views in Liu 2000; 2002.
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nature, and to be found both in the East and West (Guo 2002). In turn, his critics 
saw this position as supporting the obstruction of justice, in which law-breaking 
family members are protected from state retribution.5 Although Liu and Guo both 
appeal to the principle of universal values, Guo’s position is of particular interest 
in that it prioritizes the family over the state. Despite this stance, it seems to have 
had no negative impact on Guo’s prominent role in promoting both Confucian 
philosophy and National Learning in China.6
As with Guo Qiyong and Chen Lai, a number of prominent Western scholars who 
work in the field of Chinese philosophy have also been critical of values that are 
based on the notion of the atomic individual. In particular, the positions taken by 
North American comparative philosophers Roger Ames, Henry Rosemont, and 
Daniel Bell, have lent considerable ballast to the agenda of philosophers such as 
Chen Lai. I note also that both Ames and Bell now both work at universities in 
China. Ames and Rosemont object to forms of Western ethical theorizing, such as 
virtue ethics, in which the individual is the focus. Ames argues that 
the language of virtue ethics, in appealing as it does to the vocabulary 
of agents, acts, generic virtues, character traits, autonomy, motivation, 
reasons, choice, freedom, principles, consequences, and so on, intro-
duces distinctions that assume a foundational individualism as its start-
ing point. (Ames 2016, 142)
With its deep roots in the classical Greek philosophical narrative, he insists that 
individualism has become a default, common-sense assumption, if not an ide-
ology. He describes it as having “garnered a monopoly on human conscious-
ness without any serious alternative to challenge it”. Instead, he proposes what 
he calls Confucian role ethics, arguing that it provides a better ethical model7 
(ibid.). At the heart of Confucian role ethics is “a specific vision of human beings 
as relational persons constituted by the roles they live rather than as individual 
selves” (Rosemont and Ames 2016). Rosemont and Ames provide the following 
illustration: 
5 Essays by early participants on both sides of the debate are collected in Guo 2004.
6 It is also worth noting one of the practical outcomes of Guo’s “activism”. In August 2011, at 
the twenty-second session of the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC), Guo’s proposal to re-
store the system of “mutual concealment” was incorporated into a draft amendment to the Crimi-
nal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China and was approved in March the following 
year. See Amendment #188 listed at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/11_5/2012-03/19/con-
tent_1715305_9.htm.
7 See also Ames 2010. For a series of essays on “Confucian Role Ethics”, see Rosemont and Ames 
2016.
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Confucian normativity is defined by living one’s family roles to maxi-
mum effect … Lived family roles—mothering, brothering, granddaugh-
tering—are themselves normative standards that, informed as they are by 
existential embodiment, are much clearer and more concrete than puta-
tive moral principles. (ibid.)
This critique of ethical models in which the individual is the foundational unit, is 
also a key element in the utopian political order proposed by Chinese IR theorist, 
Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽. I am, of course, referring to his Tianxia 天下 or “All-un-
der-Heaven” model. Historian Wang Gengwu 王賡武 (Gungwu Wang) describes 
tianxia as “an abstract notion embodying the idea of a superior moral authority 
that guided behaviour in a civilized world … (It) depicts an enlightened realm 
that Confucian thinkers and mandarins raised to one of universal values, used to 
determine who was civilized and who was not” (Wang 2013, 133). In his own 
vision of tianxia, Zhao Tingyang describes the place of the individual as follows:
All-under-Heaven takes the whole world as a single political system 
that is much greater and higher than a single country or nation/state … 
The Chinese system of families, states, and All-under-Heaven—which 
differs fundamentally from the Western system of individuals, nations 
and internationals—is often criticized for its neglect of the individual as 
well as individual rights, but this is a misunderstanding … There is no 
Chinese denial of the value of the individual, but rather a denial of the 
individual to be a political foundation or starting point, because the po-
litical makes sense only when it deals with “relations” rather than “indi-
viduals”, and the political is meant to speak for co-existence rather than 
a single existence. (Zhao 2006, 34, 33)
Another influential political theorist who takes a similar stance to Ames, Rosemont 
and Zhao on the status of the individual is Daniel A. Bell. Bell is Dean of the 
School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University. 
In his earlier work, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East 
Asian Context (2006), he criticized liberal democracy and the shortcomings of 
liberal individualism. In his recent and more widely discussed book, The China 
Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (2015), Bell’s target 
is electoral democracy and what he calls the tyranny of the majority.
For Bell, the danger of electoral democracy is that irrational and self-interested 
majorities acting through the democratic process can use their power to oppress 
minorities and enact bad policies. Sound familiar? In contrast, he argues, the vir-
tue of political meritocracy is that examinations that test for voter competence 
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can help to remedy this flaw. As with Chen Lai, Bell also touts Singapore’s po-
litical meritocracy as a viable alternative to electoral democracy. As for China, 
he writes: 
The leading political idea in China––widely shared by government of-
ficials, reformers, intellectuals, and the people at large––is what I call 
“vertical democratic meritocracy”, meaning democracy at lower levels 
of government, with the political system becoming progressively more 
meritocratic at higher levels of government. (Bell 2015, xiii)
Bell, of course, has no shortage of detractors. He has been criticized for offering 
little evidence of meritocracy at work, and no more than a theoretical argument in 
its defence. Others attack him for presenting a fictional China as a rhetorical plat-
form from which to continue a long-standing debate internal to Western political 
thought—the debate between communitarianism and liberal democracy. Despite 
these and many other criticisms, his status as a public intellectual of some note in 
China has in no way been tarnished.
Mention should also be made of the Chinese philosophy specialist Stephen C. 
Angle’s self-styled “Progressive Confucianism”. The case of Angle provides a 
counterpoint to the anti-individualist stance of Chen Lai, Ames, Rosemont, Zhao, 
and Bell. According to Angle’s Progressive Confucianism
ethical insight leads to progressive political change, which in turn leads 
to greater realization of our potential for virtue … The institutions advo-
cated by Progressive Confucians are valued not because of their ancient 
pedigree but because of their capacity to assist in the realization of the 
fundamental human virtues that Confucians have valued since ancient 
times. Social structures that set barriers to the realization of virtue, there-
fore, need to be critiqued and changed. (Angle 2012, 18, 17)
Despite the fundamental differences with Ames, Rosemont and Zhao on the is-
sue of atomic individuals, Angle is sympathetic to Zhao’s normative concept of 
“All-under-Heaven”, because it requires us to “view the world from the perspec-
tive of the world”. This perspective, Angle argues, “requires us to arrive at the uni-
versal world perspective through an inclusive process, rather than universalizing a 
single perspective” (ibid., 89). Thus human rights and other principles of modern 
liberal philosophy can be figured as relevant in Confucian philosophy, even if they 
did not derive from prior Confucian values. Angle’s critics, however, argue that 
on his analysis, Confucianism is “relevant” and “‘modern’ only to the extent that it 
can accommodate the values of some form of liberal democracy”. In other words, 
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Angle continues “to articulate the validity of Confucian ideas in terms shaped al-
most exclusively by modern European thought and experience” (Jenco, 2017, 6).
Kang Clique
Over the past decade, a group of younger academics based at various universities 
in China has also been arguing for the priority of the nation over the individual. 
This group has become known informally as the Kang Clique (Kang dang 康黨). 
Several prominent figures associated with the Kang Clique were also participants 
in a workshop held at East China Normal University in Shanghai in 2011. The 
transcripts of discussions from the workshop was published two years later under 
the title, He wei pushi? Shei zhi jiazhi? Dangdai Rujia pushi jiazhi 何謂普世？誰
之价值？當代儒家論普世價值 (What is Universal? Whose Values? Contempo-
rary Confucians Discuss Universal Values) (Zeng and Guo 2014).
The name “Kang Clique” derives from the call by some of its more prominent 
“members” such as Chen Ming 陳明 and Gan Chunsong 干春松 to “return to 
Kang Youwei”. Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) was a major intellectual and 
reformer active in the transition between the Qing Empire and the establishment 
of Republican China. For many Confucian revivalists today, particularly those 
who self-consciously identify as so-called “Mainland New Confucians” (Dalu 
xin Rujia 大陸新儒家), Kang had proposed a superior blueprint for nation-build-
ing and state-building, at a critical juncture in China’s history, as it moved from 
being an empire to being a nation-state. 
Chen Ming, for example, writes that in Kang Youwei’s blueprint, “the integrity 
of the nation and maintenance of the people’s livelihood took historical priori-
ty over individual rights, constitutional democracy, freedom of belief and other 
value priorities of the Enlightenment project” (Gan et al. 2104, 25). Here the 
Enlightenment project refers to the liberal intellectual tradition in modern China. 
Chen laments that ultimately Kang’s vision was highjacked by the agenda set by 
liberal intellectuals. He continues: “The Enlightenment project and its utopian 
narrative should only have been chosen if they could have served as a program for 
salvation; we should not and cannot allow theory to swallow up facts, or means to 
become ends, but, most unfortunately this where our biggest problems are today” 
(ibid.). In other words, the utopian visions of Chinese liberals continue to block 
Kang’s blueprint from being realized. For Confucian revivalists such as Chen 
Ming, a key element in Kang’s blueprint was a proposal to make Confucianism 
the state religion, and this is something that Chen Ming and his colleagues con-
tinue to argue for today.
326 John MAKEhAM: ChinEsE PhilosoPhy And UnivErsAl vAlUEs in ContEMPorAry ChinA
Kang Youwei is also relevant to the topic of tianxia or “All-under-Heaven”. Kang 
was associated with a lineage of Confucian scholarship known as New Text Con-
fucianism. New Text Confucianism has its origins in the Han dynasty (206 BC–
220 AD), but was revived and creatively reinterpreted in the nineteenth century. 
One of the key features of New Text Confucianism is its emphasis on a cycli-
cal view of history, characterized by a three-stage periodization. Kang Youwei 
transformed this cyclical model into a teleological model of three-stage progress, 
which culminates in the utopian vision of an “age of universal peace” (taiping shi 
太平世) or “great unity” (datong 大同). 
As with Chen Lai, Kang attached a particularly high importance to the moral ideal 
of ren (humaneness). For Kang, ren represents a metaphysical world view; “a 
moral ideal or value pattern built into the structure of reality” (Chang 1987, 37). 
Furthermore, Kang’s understanding of the moral ideal of ren was teleological. He 
projected the full realization of ren to a distant but definite point in the future: the 
“age of universal peace” or “great unity”. His vision of this “great unity” amount-
ed to an “all-inclusive universal society, with no room place for the territorial 
state” (ibid., 62).
Xu Jinlin’s New Tianxia
Another prominent Chinese public intellectual who has also been active in pro-
moting the concept of tianxia as an inclusive political institution that transcends 
nation-states and nationalism is the Shanghai-based academic, Xu Jilin 許紀霖. 
In sharp contrast to the “Kang Clique”, Xu is strongly opposed to nationalism. Xu 
maintains that nationalism can lead to horrific large-scale violence, such as the 
two world wars. His antidote to nationalism is what he calls the “new  tianxia”. 
He describes tianxia in traditional China as “a world spatial imaginary with Chi-
na’s central plains at the core”, and claims that the values of this civilizational 
tradition were universal and humanistic rather than particular and unique to one 
civilization or culture:
Behind the traditional Chinese empire was a tianxia consciousness for 
all humanity, a set of universal values that transcended the particular 
interests of any given dynasty. Their source was the moral way of heav-
en. These values served as the standard for determining right and wrong 
throughout All Under Heaven, constrained the behaviour of rulers, and 
determined the legitimacy of a given dynasty’s rule. (Xu 2015)
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He then makes the following comments about post-tianxia China, that is, China 
of the last one hundred years: “An empire without tianxia consciousness means 
that the imperial body no longer possesses a soul with universal values and a civ-
ilization that puts people at ease. In its place, there is nothing but calculation of 
the nation-state’s self-interest.” (ibid.)
Yet if traditional tianxia was so cosmopolitan and universal, how does Xu ex-
plain the age-old distinction between barbarians (yi 夷) and Chinese (xia 夏), a 
distinction that has been a consistent hallmark of the notion of tianxia? While 
acknowledging that people in pre-modern China spoke not just of tianxia but also 
of the difference between barbarians and Chinese, Xu insists: 
In early China, (notions of) “Chinese and barbarian” were completely 
different from the dichotomies of “China and the West” and “us and 
them” that today’s extreme nationalists are always talking about … 
That which determined the distinction between barbarian and Chinese 
was solely whether or not a civilization was associated with the values 
of tianxia. Whereas tianxia was absolute, the (categories of) barbarian 
and Chinese were relative. Whereas blood and race were innate and un-
changeable, civilization could be studied and emulated. (ibid.)
He further claims that in traditional China, “tianxia did not belong to one particu-
lar race or country” (ibid.). 
Despite Xu Jilin’s reputation as a liberal public intellectual strongly opposed to 
nationalism, some of his discussion of China as a civilizational power invites 
questions about his vision for a so-called “new tianxia”: 
If China’s goal is not to stop with the construction of the nation-state, but 
rather to re-establish itself as a civilizational power with great influence 
in global affairs, then its every word and deed must take universal civi-
lization as its point of departure, and in global dialogue it must have its 
own unique understanding of universal civilization … As a great power 
with global influence, what China must now realize is not just the dream 
of rejuvenating the nation and the state, but also the re-orientation of its 
national spirit toward the world. What China needs to reconstruct is not 
a particularistic culture suited to one country and one people, but rather 
a civilization that has universal value for all humanity. Values that are 
“good” for China, particularly the core values that concern our shared 
human nature, should in the same way be “good” for all humanity. (ibid.)
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The message here is decidedly mixed. On the one hand, Xu calls for the recon-
struction of values that have universal significance for all humanity and not just 
one culture or society. On the other hand, this aspiration seems to be fundamental-
ly compromised by his other claim that due to China’s “own unique understand-
ing of universal civilization”, which in turn is grounded in China’s pre-modern 
tradition of tianxia, then China should seek to “re-establish itself as a civilization-
al power with great influence in global affairs” and reconstruct “a civilization that 
has universal value for all humanity”. 
Xu supports his claim that China is well prepared to “re-establish itself as a civ-
ilizational power” by invoking American political scientist Lucian Pye’s famous 
aphorism that “China is a civilization pretending to be a nation-state” (Pye 1992, 
232). Xu reinforces this sense of historical destiny by further claiming that “China 
is a world power. As a nation of the world that bears Hegel’s ‘world spirit’ (Welt-
geist) it is only proper that it take responsibility for the world and for the ‘world 
spirit’ it has inherited. This ‘world spirit’ is the new tianxia that will emerge in the 
form of universal values.” (Xu, 15)
As for his assertion that “Values that are ‘good’ for China, particularly the core 
values that concern our shared human nature, should in the same way be ‘good’ 
for all humanity”, is its import really much different from that conveyed by Chen 
Lai’s assertion that humaneness is the foundation not only of Confucian values, 
but also of the universal values of freedom, equality, and justice? After all, from a 
Confucian perspective, humaneness is an innate quality of our human nature, and 
so must be good for all humanity.
Indeed, despite the appeal to universal values, in Xu Jilin’s notion of new tianxia 
it seems it is Confucianism that is presented as the authority for determining 
which values constitute “core values”. He explains that, historically, the greatness 
of Confucianism came from its capacity to transcend the interests of the individ-
ual and the dynasty. Today, being above the state, Confucianism “possesses the 
universal values of tianxia”. By insisting that “values that are ‘good’ for China … 
should in the same way be ‘good’ for all humanity”, Xu is making a case for 
expanding the range of universal values, but in a way that privileges Confucian 
values.
China’s proponents of tianxia are not without their critics. One of the most impor-
tant is historian Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光 of Fudan University: 
In recent years, some Chinese scholars have felt that, as China begins its 
“rise” after several centuries of a world order led by the West, a “tianxia 
order” or “tianxia-ism” that has its origins in traditional China should be 
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deemed a fresh resource for replacing the world order that has been in 
place since the early modern period (Ge 2014, 161).
Ge points out that these scholars 
argue that, on a philosophical level, the Confucian world is a world with-
out borders, one without the distinctions of inner and outer, us and them. 
It is a world in which all people are treated equally. Accordingly, this 
tianxia order should be used to replace the current world order. 
He warns that if this kind of thinking is not stripped of its core of nationalism 
(which sees China as the “centre of tianxia”) and its attitude of arrogant self-re-
gard, “then it can easily become a new form of chauvinism that claims to have 
universal relevance under the cover of representations such as ‘equality of the 
multitude of states’ and ‘all in the four seas are one family’” (ibid., 173).
Ge is also critical of some of the more radical Confucian revivalists in contem-
porary China, known as political Confucians or “mainland New Confucians”, 
which includes members of the “Kang clique”, contributors to the publication 
He wei pushi? Shei de jiazhi? Dangdai Rujia pushi jiazhi (discussed above), as 
well as contributors to a wide range of more recent writings, including the 2016 
volume, Zhongguo bixu zai Ruhua: “Dalu xin Rujia” xin zhuzhang 中國必須再
儒化：“大陸新儒家”新主張 (China Must Re-Confucianize: New Proposals by 
‘Mainland New Confucians’). The fact that a scholar of Ge Zhaoguang’s standing 
in the academic community should devote a 33,000 Chinese character essay (Ge 
2017) to critiquing their views, underscores the growing influence of this con-
servative, and extremely nationalistic, group of ideologues.
In the essay he describes how the Mainland New Confucians feel that to ac-
knowledge universal values is to succumb to “Westernization”, and amounts to 
“self-barbarization” (自我夷狄化). He points out that the idea of “barbarization” 
is an extremely strong accusation, because it elevates the distinction between Chi-
nese and barbarian from that of a difference in values to that of a clash between 
the civilized and uncivilized, or even places races and cultures in absolute oppo-
sition. I would again note that the distinction between Chinese (華) and barbarian 
(夷) is very much central to traditional tianxia discourse.
Concluding Remarks
Chen Lai’s creative appropriation of Zhu Xi’s philosophy to make humaneness 
(ren) the foundation not only of Confucian virtues, but also of the universal values 
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of freedom, equality, and justice, is without doubt an exercise in hybridization, al-
beit a highly reductionist and politically calculated hybridization. We will have to 
wait to see whether an ideological cocktail of Confucian and core socialist values 
will provide the right formula for a future tianxia world order.
Ge Zhaoguang warns of the following scenario if the concept of tianxia is brought 
to life:
When imagined versions of the tribute system are taken to be real, and 
memories of the Celestial Empire are unearthed, then perhaps Chinese 
culture and national sentiment will turn into a nationalism (or statism) 
that opposes both global civilization and regional cooperation. Such a 
development would truly lead to a “clash of civilizations”. (Ge 2014, 178)
Or is the future already here? In an article published in Foreign Affairs, soci-
ologist Salvatore Babones describes what he calls the American Tianxia. Let me 
conclude with his description of the dystopian, brave new world he conjures up:
Today the United States is at the center of a global tianxia. This “Amer-
ican Tianxia” is much more than a state or country, or even an empire. 
It pervades all areas of life. In today’s connected world, Chinese busi-
nesses, Russian universities, and even Iranian revolutions are run on 
American lines. The Islamic State (ISIS) recommends that its fighters 
use Android devices whereas North Korea’s ruling Kim family famously 
prefers Apple. Many people around the world oppose the United States, 
its policies, and its president, but they still want to send their children to 
American universities, invest their money in American companies, and 
express their opinions on American social networks.
This is not some kind of consumerism run amok. Standing at the center 
of the global order, the United States has, over the last quarter century, 
reoriented the way the world—and especially the world’s elite—works, 
plays, and thinks. It has brought them into an international hierarchy in 
which gaining status requires succeeding within U.S.-centered networks 
and playing by U.S. rules. And it makes twenty-first century America 
more powerful than any empire, kingdom, or commonwealth in history. 
The United States—that is, the country itself—has plenty of hard and 
soft power. But the United States has limits. The American Tianxia does 
not. (Balbones 2017)
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